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ANOTHER LOOK AT THE AIR POLLUTION CRISIS IN 
BIRMINGHAM 
By James R. Walpole* 
In mid-November, 1971, the air pollution level in the area of 
Birmingham, Alabama rose so high as a result of an air inversion 
that it directly threatened the health of persons in that vicinity. The 
United States Environmental Protection Agency, recognizing the 
extent of the danger, requested the Department of Justice to take 
the appropriate legal steps immediately to reduce harmful emis-
sions into the air by the industries causing the major portion of the 
air pollution. For the first time, and as yet the only time, the "Emer-
gency Powers" section of the Clean Air Act was utilized. l This sec-
tion provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the Administra-
tor upon receipt of evidence that a pollution source or combination of 
sources (including moving sources) is presenting an imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment to the health of persons, and that appropriate 
State or local authorities have not acted to abate such sources, may 
bring suit on behalf of the United States in the appropriate United 
States district court to immediately restrain any person causing or con-
tributing to the alleged pollution to stop the emission of air pollutants 
causing or contributing to such pollution or to take such other action as 
may be necessary. 
A recent issue of Environmental Affairs2 contains an article 
entitled "Legal Anatomy of an Air Pollution Emergency," by Doug 
Rendleman, Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Ala-
bama. This article will first describe the Birmingham air emergency 
and then take issue with certain of Mr. Rendleman's conclusions in 
his Environmental Affairs article. 
1. THE BIRMINGHAM EMERGENCY 
In order to appreciate the significance of the air pollution levels 
which occurred in Birmingham, it is necessary to discuss the meth-
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ods of measuring air pollution which were used to obtain the Bir-
mingham readings. Particulate matter:! in the air can, under certain 
conditions, have an adverse effect on health at levels as low as 100 
micrograms per cubic meter.1 The national primary and secondary 
ambient air quality standards for particulate matter, which are de-
signed to protect the public health and welfare, are 260 micrograms 
per cubic meter (maximum 24-hour concentration not to be ex-
ceeded more than once per year) and 150 micrograms per cubic 
meter" (maximum 24-hour concentration not to be exceeded more 
than once per year), respectively.6 The federal regulations dealing 
with particulate levels provide that control action should be taken 
when the particulate level reaches 375 at any monitoring site. This 
is known as the "Alert" stage. 7 More drastic action should be taken 
if the particulate count climbs as high as 625-the "Warning" level. x 
The most stringent action should be taken at the "Emergency" 
level-when the particulate count reaches 875 and can be expected 
to remain there for 12 or more hours.!! The actions taken at the Alert 
and Warning levels are intended to prevent the particulate count 
from ever reaching the actual Emergency level. 
In mid-November, 1971, a weather inversion settled over the Bir-
mingham area so that there was little or no dispersion of the particu-
late matter emitted into the air by the factories located there. As a 
result, the amount of particulates in the air continued to increase 
and, on November 16, both the Alert level and the Warning level 
were exceeded. Two measurements were taken that day, one show-
ing a particulate count of 722 and the other a count of 771. The 
weather forecast indicated that the inversion would probably re-
main the same for at least two more days and that dispersion would 
be poor for some time thereafter. The Jefferson County Department 
of Health, realizing the danger that these pollution levels presented, 
contacted the industries in the area which emitted the highest level 
of particulates, according to its own records. The Department re-
quested each industry to voluntarily reduce its emission levels be-
cause of the serious air pollution problem. In writing, it urged 23 
companies to reduce their emissions drastically and suggested that 
"due to the seriousness of the situation, this office feels that an 
overall particulate emission reduction on the order of 60% is justi-
fied."'11 The replies which were solicited and received by the Depart-
ment showed minimal overall reductions in emissions, and some of 
the largest industries did not even estimate their reductions. On 
November 17,1972, the inversion, as expected, did not disperse. The 
particulate level was measured that day at 758, well above the 
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Warning level of 625. 
Although it became apparent to the Jefferson County Depart-
ment of Health that immediate action was essential to reduce the 
pollution level, county regulations did not authorize any immediate 
action in this type of situation nor had the newly enacted Alabama 
air pollution control statute been fully implemented because the air 
pollution control commission authorized by the statute had not yet 
been appointed. Thus, the local and state agencies were fully aware 
of the danger but were not in a position to deal effectively with an 
emergency situation. 
The United States Environmental Protection Agency, which had 
been in communication with the state and local agencies, met and 
discussed the matter with those agencies on November 17,11 at 
which time all authorities agreed that immediate action should be 
taken to protec,t the health of area residents. Early that evening, the 
Environmental Protection Agency referred the matter to the De-
partment of Justice and requested that immediate action be taken 
pursuant to Section 303 of the Clean Air Act. Within five or six 
hours the Department of Justice, working through the United States 
Attorney's office in Birmingham, prepared a motion for a temporary 
restraining order seeking to reduce the emissions of those industries 
which the Jefferson County Department of Health had listed as the 
largest sources of particulate matter in the area. The motion was 
accompanied by three affidavits: the first, by a doctor of medicine 
with a specialty in general preventive medicine, stating that parti-
culate levels of greater than 700 for two consecutive days would 
constitute an imminent and substantial endangerment to a signifi-
cant portion of the general population in the area; the second, by 
the Assistant Director of the Jefferson County Bureau of Environ-
mental Health, stating that the particulate level on November 16, 
1971, in the Birmingham area was measured at 722 and 771 and that 
particulate levels were 728, 758 and 725 micrograms per cubic meter 
on N ovem ber 17, 1971; and the third, by a meteorologist, stating 
that there was currently an inversion in the Birmingham area which 
was expected to continue for at least one more day, after which 
dispersion would be very slow. In addition to the motion and the 
affidavits, a complaint and a proposed order requesting specific 
relief as to each of the 23 industries were prepared. Because of the 
urgency of the situation and because the Department of Justice did 
not have on hand the names of the attorneys representing all of the 
23 companies, the motion requested the court to issue the temporary 
restraining order ex parte since "the discharges constitute an immi-
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nent and substantial endangerment to the health of persons." Fed-
eral District Judge Sam Pointer was contacted by telephone and 
arrangements were made to present the papers to him when they 
were completed. The papers were completed-at approximately 
midnight and presented to Judge Pointer at his home-at approxi-
mately 1:00 a.m. on November 18. After reading the pleadings and 
discussing the matter with the attorney from the Department of 
Justice, an Assistant United States Attorney, and representatives 
from the Environmental Protection Agency, the Judge granted the 
temporary restraining order. The order was designed to require vir-
tual elimination of emissions from each source, but it was couched 
in language which would allow gradual reduction of production over 
a period of several hours in order to avoid damaging any equip-
ment. 12 The government attorneys then called each of the 23 indus-
try defendants, between 2:30 a.m. and 5:00 a.m., and described the 
contents of the order to them. '3 
A hearing on the temporary restraining order was scheduled for 
November 19, at 9:00 a.m., in the Federal District Court in Birming-
ham. Before that time, however, two fortunate events occurred: (1) 
the inversion began to shift from the area, and (2) it rained in 
Birmingham. These two occurrences reduced the particulate level 
to 217, well below the Alert level of 325, and thus eliminated any 
further need for the temporary restraining order. At the hearing on 
November 19, the Government indicated to Judge Pointer that the 
particulate count no longer constituted an immediate threat to the 
health of persons in the area. Since the emergency conditions had 
ceased to exist, the Government moved that the order be dissolved 
and the complaint be dismissed, and the Judge granted the motion. 
II. PROFESSOR RENDLEMAN'S ANALYSIS 
The first portion of the Rendleman article in Environmental 
Affairs describes the air pollution situation in Birmingham, while 
the remainder discusses the "hardships which flow from the nature 
of the adjudication" and deals with "possible remedies."u The fol-
lowing comments concern the latter portion of the article. 
The apparent focal point of the article is that "[t]he major legal 
difficulty [of the ex parte Temporary Restraining Order], was the 
lack of notice to the defendants."'5 The basis for the complaint 
concerning lack of notice, however, appears to be that notice should 
have been given as a courtesy rather than as a legal necessity. For 
example, Professor Rendleman states: 
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The substantive provisions of the November 18th order, although un-
precedented, were authorized by law. Attorneys for the industries were 
outraged. Some of the outrage should have been anticipated because of 
the drastic change in enforcement policy. Some of the outrage, however, 
could have been prevented by sedulous procedural fairness. Failure to 
extend procedural protection to the defendants exacerbated rather than 
ameliorated the shock and outrage which was due to the change in the 
application of the substantive law. ls [emphasis added] 
He also notes that: 
Other reasons for notice relate to precision in the litigation process. If 
the defendant is given notice and is present at a hearing, he can partici-
pate in the process of finding facts, applying the law and, in equitable 
cases, formulating the decree. 17 
The article, then, apparently advocates providing each potential 
defendant with formal notice that certain action is being considered 
by the Government. Applying this point of view to the Birmingham 
situation, the Government would have been required to provide an 
attorney for each of the 23 companies with notice. Each company 
would doubtless have wished to discuss the matter prior to the filing 
of any action, since such a procedure is common and often elimi-
nates minor difficulties before a matter is presented to a judge. This 
approach, however, is not required in every situation involving 
temporary restraining orders. To the contrary, Rule 65(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically authorizes the issuance 
of ex parte temporary restraining orders. The Government's motion 
for the November 18 order requested that the order issue without 
notice to the defendants on the ground that, unless the discharges 
of particulate matter were immediately restrained, the health of 
people in the area would continue to suffer immediate and irrepara-
ble harm. Judge Pointer obviously felt that this reason was suffi-
cient grounds for an ex parte order. IS 
Providing formal notice to each of the 23 defendants would have 
been inconsistent with the critical nature of the situation in Bir-
mingham. The particulate level had far exceeded the Alert level of 
375 and the Warning level of 625, and had reached the level where 
continued exposure to the pollution would cause widespread harm 
to persons in the area. As mentioned above, the Jefferson County 
Health Department had attempted without success to obtain volun-
tary cooperation from the local industries. The emergency nature of 
the situation demanded that action be taken as swiftly as possible; 
and the Federal Government acted swiftly by obtaining the tempo-
rary restraining order, the provisions of which, "although unprece-
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dented, were authorized by law."19 
Professor Rendleman's next theme is the "hardships" imposed 
upon the industries as the result of the temporary restraining order: 
The effects of the order in United States v. United States Steel could 
have been severe. In addition to loss of production and profits, possible 
damage to equipmenFIl and lost wages, corporate images were 
tarnished . ... Few would disagree with enjoining the uncooperative 
polluters in an emergency and most would agree that it is better to do 
too much than too little to end the pollution episode. Most would also 
agree that it is better to move with celerity than circumspection. Haste 
may, however, create injustice. 21 [emphasis added] 
It is unfortunate that "corporate images were tarnished," but, lest 
there be any misunderstanding, the 23 companies that were en-
joined on November 18 were the same 23 companies which earlier 
in the week had been requested in writing to reduce their emissions 
voluntarily. The statement regarding uncooperative polluters in an 
emergency would appear to be more germane. 
The next portion of the Rendleman article discusses the remedies 
available to an "incorrectly enjoined defendant" in a situation 
where a private individual is a plaintiff. After discussing the theory 
of inverse condemnation, Professor Rendleman notes that: 
There is an impressive body of medical evidence for the proposition 
that extended exposure to high level particulates in the atmosphere is 
a definite health hazard; and, although the precise point where particu-
late count, weather forecast, and health emergency became congruent 
is somewhat a matter of individual choice, the evidence supports the 
assertion that a particulate count of 700 for 48 consecutive hours will 
cause serious problems for vulnerable segments of the population and 
will even cause some deaths. 22 [emphasis added] 
He concludes, however, that "[T]he emergency ... was grave, 
and the measures had a reasonable relation to the emergency. In-
verse condemnation does not seem to provide redress."2:1 
After stating that a particulate count of 700 for two consecutive 
days will cause serious health problems and even deaths, the author 
contends that: 
Several aspects of the lawsuit are subject to criticisms. The particulate 
count was high, but Birmingham had come to expect that . . . . The 
order in United States v. United States Steel can be seen as a dragnet, 
obtained at midnight by arbitrary government bureaucrats. 2~ 
In his summary, Professor Rendleman concedes the possibility 
that the Government's action was necessary to convince the indus-
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tries that it meant business. In his view the entire case was cloaked 
with overwhelmingly opaque ambiance as the result of "the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency's unfortunate failure to act in the 
open." Curiously, the author then states: 
If the Environmental Protection Agency had not acted, no one could 
have. In this sense the action taken was exactly what Congress intended. 
State emergency plans should, in the future, eliminate the need for 
federal emergency actions. 25 
The author concedes that the action taken by the Government was 
specifically what Congress intended in enacting the Clean Air Act. 
An underlying theme of the article is also seen here: that state 
implementation plans should make federal emergency actions un-
necessary and that the plans should so provide. This position has 
two basic weaknesses. First, it is immaterial whether state imple-
mentation plllns2H include provisions for federal intervention in 
emergency situations because the Clean Air Act specifically author-
izes federal action in emergency situations. 27 Thus, action may be 
taken by the Federal Government regardless of the provisions of 
state plans. 2x Second, such a position totally ignores the philosophy 
behind the Emergency Powers section of the Act. The purpose of the 
section is to assure protection for the health of persons in a situation 
where the local and state agencies have not acted to eliminate the 
pollution. Federal action should not be taken under the Clean Air 
Act where the emergency is being eliminated by the state or local 
officials. The Birmingham situation was actually quite unique be-
cause neither the state nor local agencies, at the time, were able to 
act to abate the pollution. As mentioned above, all the members of 
the state air pollution control commission had not yet been ap-
pointed, and the Department of Health's regulations did not author-
ize the immediate action required by the situation. 
III. CONCLUSION 
When lives are actually in danger, action must be taken, whether 
by a federal agency or a state agency, and it must be swift and 
decisive. Such action can be accomplished through the cooperation 
and coordination of state and local agencies as well as by federal 
intervention. The Birmingham situation, where the local agencies 
willingly cooperated with and provided assistance to both the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency and the Department of Justice, was 
an excellent example of how such agencies can work together to 
solve a pollution crisis. 
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With these things in mind, the action taken in Birmingham 
should be viewed not as a dragnet obtained at midnight by arbitrary 
government bureaucrats, but rather as action which was authorized 
by federal law and was necessary to prevent an emergency from 
becoming a tragedy. 
FOOTNOTES 
* Attorney, Pollution Control Section, Department of Justice, 
Washington, D.C. The author represented the Justice Department 
during the Birmingham crisis. 
142 U.S.C. §1857(h)(i) (1970). 
22 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 90, (Spring, 1972). Hereinafter this 
shall be referred to as the Environmental Affairs article. 
:IParticulate matter refers to those particles of material discharged 
into the air which finally settle back to the ground. It has been 
defined as "any material, except water in uncombined form, that 
is or has been airborne and exists as a liquid or a solid at standard 
conditions." 40 C.F.R. §51, Appendix B, 1.0. 
ISee. Air Quality Criteria for Particulate Matter, Summary and 
Conclusions, United States Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare, at 18-9. 
"Hereinafter micrograms per cubic meter will be referred to as the 
particulate count or the particulate level. 
0;40 C.F.R. §§ 50.6, 50.7. 
'40 C.F.R. §51, Appendix L, 1.l(b). 
~40 C.F.R. §51, Appendix L, 1.l(c). 
1140 C.F.R. §51, Appendix L, 1.l(d). 
IIIENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS, supra n. 2, at 97. 
"A representative from the Department of Justice and from the 
local United States Attorney's office also attended the meeting. 
12For example, the order required U.S. Pipe and Foundry Com-
pany to "eliminate emissions of particulate matter from all copo-
las adding no new charges and shutting down copolas after present 
heat is finished," and it required U.S. Steel Corporation to "reduce 
emissions of particulate matter from all open hearth furnaces by 
ceasing feed to the open hearth and maintaining the heat." 
1:IThe ,Jefferson County Department of Health provided the names 
and phone numbers of persons to call at many of the plants; the 
remainder of the phone numbers were merely obtained from the 
telephone directory. 
"ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS, supra n. 2, at 10l. 
1"Id. at 101-2. 
'HId. at 10:3. 
Ii Id. at 104. 
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"The Environmental Affairs article (at 107) refers to a "separate 
certificate" which must be filed with a motion for an ex parte tem-
porary restraining order. However, Federal Rule 65(b) nowhere re-
quires that a "separate certificate" be filed regarding the notice 
provision of the Rule. Also, although the motion itself does not 
specifically state that the Government was not then aware of the 
names of all the attorneys representing the defendants, the Judge 
was informed of this state of affairs prior to his issuance of the order. 
'!'ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS, supra n. 2, at 103. 
lllThere was no indication whatsoever at the hearings on 
November 19 that any equipment was actually damaged In any 
respect. 
lIENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS, supra n. 2, at 108. 
lQd. at 11:3. 
l::Id. 
l'Id. at 114-5. 
l·'Id. at 115. 
lHSection 110 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857(c)(5) requires 
each State to submit a plan to the Environmental Protection 
Agency which provides for the "implementation, maintenance and 
enforcement" of the national ambient air quality standards. 
27The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 
contain an emergency powers provision almost identical to that in 
the Clean Air Act; see 33 U.S.C. §1364. 
lSIn all likelihood, the Environmental Protection Agency would 
not approve a state implementation plan which attempted to ex-
clude federal emergency action. 
